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This study explored British and Pakistani 4- to 7-year-olds’ (N = 188) understanding of
death. The aim was to examine possible influences on the acquisition of the
subcomponents of the death concept by investigating how they are understood by
children of different ages and cultural and religious backgrounds. Three groups of children
were compared: White British and British Muslim living in London, and Pakistani Muslim
living in rural Pakistan. In linewith previous research (Slaughter, 2005, Aust. Psychol., 40(3),
179), irreversibility of death was one of the first subcomponents to be acquired, while
causality was the last. The two groups of British children shared many similarities in their
understanding of inevitability, applicability, irreversibility, and cessation. Pakistani Muslim
children understood irreversibility earlier than did children in both British groups. In all
three cultural groups, children’s responses demonstrated very limited understanding of
causality. Our findings support the view that aspects of a mature understanding of death
develop between the ages of 4 and 7 years and that the process of understanding death as
a biological event is, to a great extent, universal. They also suggest that aspects of
children’s reasoning are influenced by culturally specific experiences, particularly those
arising from living in rural versus urban settings.
Death is one of many related concepts – such as the mind–body distinction (Inagaki &
Hatano, 1993), illness and contagion (Kalish, 1999), inheritance (Solomon, Johnson,
Zaitchik, & Carey, 1996), and the life cycle (Jaakola & Slaughter, 2002) – that constitute
children’s broader understanding of the biological domain. Findings from a number of
studies in different countries suggest that children’s understanding of death follows a
broadly consistent developmental pattern (Harris & Gimenez, 2005; Slaughter, 2005).
Preschoolers do not grasp the biological basis of death and tend to believe that death is
a different state of life – a state of prolonged sleep. At this age, children often say that only
old and ill people die, that dead people need to eat and breathe, and that they can still see,
hear, or dream (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004). Between 5 and 10 years, children come to
understand the five key biological facts about death (Lazar & Torney-Purta, 1991; Poling &
Evans, 2004; Slaughter& Lyons, 2003). They realize that (1) all living thingsmust die 1 day
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(inevitability); (2) death happens to all living things (applicability or universality); (3) once
people are dead, they cannot come back to life (irreversibility); (4) when death occurs, all
bodily and mental processes stop (cessation); and (5) in biological terms, death is caused
by the breakdown of bodily functions (causality).
These five subcomponents are not acquired at the same time (Kenyon, 2001;
Slaughter, 2005; Speece & Brent, 1984). The least complex subcomponent, and the one
that seems to be acquired first, is death irreversibility. Children around the age of 5 first
realize that death is final. In the early school years, children grasp the ideas that death is
inevitable, happens to all living things, and involves the cessation of all bodily and mental
functions. Causality of death is the last subcomponent to be acquired, as it involves the
understanding of complex processes that result in the breakdown of the body’s
functioning (Slaughter & Griffiths, 2007).
Cultural and religious influences
Research into children’s biological reasoning provides evidence for cross-cultural
universalities in the development of children’s ideas in this domain – including those
concerning death – but also for cultural influences (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Legare &
Gelman, 2009; Ross, Medin, Coley, & Atran, 2003).
Schonfeld and Smilanski (1989) explored the impact of sociocultural influences on the
conceptualization of death amongst 4- to 12-year-old Israeli and American children and
found that Israeli children understood the notions of irreversibility and cessation better
than their American counterparts. The unstable political situation in Israel at that time,
and children’s exposure to discussions about death, might have influenced their
awareness of some of its subcomponents. Mahon, Goldberg, and Washington (1999)
reported that Israeli 6-year-olds had an accurate notion of the cessation of death. All
children in the study were exposed to conversations about death due to their fathers’
involvement in military operations, which might have accelerated their understanding
that death is final.
Other studies suggest that children from religious backgrounds (e.g., Muslim or
Baptist) have a less scientific understanding of the irreversibility and inevitability of death
than their non-religious peers, due to religious ideas about life after death that contradict
biological explanations (Antony & Bhana, 1988–1989; Candy-Gibbs, Sharp, & Petrun,
1985). Florian and Kravetz (1985) reported that Jewish and Christian children living in
Israel had a more scientific concept of death by the age of 10 than their Muslim and Druze
counterparts, possibly due to the different religious beliefs espoused within their
communities.
In a study of Spanish children, Bering, Hernandez Blasi, and Bjorklund (2005) found
that 4- to 12-year-olds attending Catholic schools were more likely than those in secular
schools to believe that the biological and mental functions of a dead mouse (the main
character in the study’s stories) continue after death. Children exposed to religious
instruction about the ‘afterlife’ may differ in their understanding of cessation from
children without religious input because the idea that some processes continue after
death is supported by their educational and religious background.
Harris and Gimenez (2005) found that beliefs in the afterlife amongst Spanish children
increased between the ages of 7 and 11 and that these beliefsweremore likely to appear in
the context of religious narratives than in the context ofmedical narratives. It is suggested
that children growing up in cultures where both religious and biological views about
death are supported often engage in a form of ‘dualistic’ thinking about the continuity of
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mental functions after death (Harris, 2011). In this view, explanations about death that
appear incompatible (e.g., biological, religious, and spiritual) coexist in children’s
thinking and form the basis of their understanding (Legare, Evans, Rosengren, & Harris,
2012; Rosengren, Gutierrez, & Schein, 2014).
The existing research in this area sheds light on how some culturally specific
experiences (e.g., exposure to discussions, religion) may influence children’s under-
standing of death. However, it is based largely on urban samples fromWestern societies,
while limited evidence exists from studies in developing, rural, and traditional
communities with different cultural and educational experiences that might either delay
or accelerate children’s conceptualizations (Coley, 2000; Inagaki & Hatano, 2006).
One such study was carried out by Astuti and Harris (2008) who explored the
conceptions of death amongst Vezo people in rural Madagascar, a communitywith strong
beliefs in the presence of dead ancestors amongst the living. Five-year to 71-year-oldswere
interviewed about their beliefs concerning the cessation of mental and bodily processes
after death. Although 5-year-olds were unsystematic in their responses, 7-year-olds gave
consistently biological explanations for the cessation of bodily and mental functions.
Older children and adults believed that, althoughbodilyprocesses stop after death,mental
processes such as remembering and knowing continue. Young children’s early grasp of
the notion of cessation reflects their exposure to animal and human death that allows an
early understanding of what it means to be dead (they are present when animals are
slaughtered, are expected to attend funerals and wakes, and are obliged to look at their
dead parents to ‘register’ the fact that theywill never see them again). Older children’s and
adults’ ‘dual’ conception of death (biological and spiritual) reflects Vezo people’s
exposure to the belief that the spirits of the dead are present amongst the living (Astuti,
2011).
These findings highlight the significance of cross-cultural research for our under-
standing of the influence of culture on children’s conceptual development. As Legare and
Gelman (2009) point out, it is important to explore children’s biological reasoning in
different cultural contexts, so that we can identify what is general in the development of
their understanding and what is influenced by culturally specific or educational
experiences.
The present study
The aim of this study was to explore the influence of culturally specific experiences,
including religion, on children’s conceptualizations of death.We compared three groups:
British White children attending secular state primary schools in London, British Muslim
children attending London state schools but also religious classes in their local mosques,
and Pakistani Muslim children from two villages in Pakistan attending state primary
schools. These groups provided uswith a natural experiment for investigating someof the
influences on children’s developing concept of death. For example, if cultural
experiences – particularly those arising from living in rural or urban settings – were a
key factor in influencing children’s understanding of death, then we might expect
differences between rural Pakistani children and their urban British counterparts. If
children’s religion influenced their understanding of death, we might expect the British
and PakistaniMuslims to bemore similar to one another than to theWhite British children.
With respect to children’s cultural experiences, those growing up in rural Pakistan
have first-hand knowledge of life and death processes through their daily contact with
animals. In these rural and often poor communities, families raise domestic animals, such
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as cows, goats, or chickens, to providemeat, milk, eggs, and dung (for domestic cooking).
Children are involved in raising these animals and routinely witness their slaughter for
meat or for religious purposes. One significant religious celebrationwhere this practice is
observed by many Muslims is ‘Eid-ul-Adha’ or ‘Festival of Sacrifice’. During this festival,
Muslims around the world sacrifice animals and share the meat amongst family members,
friends, and the poor. Although this celebration is also important for British Muslims, in
Britain, the animals are taken to abattoirs, so children do not experience them being
sacrificed. In this study, all Pakistani Muslim children either had a domestic animal or no
longer had one because it had previously been sacrificed.
Moreover, Pakistani Muslim children – particularly those living in rural and impover-
ished communities –usually livewithmembers of their extended families, and so theyoften
have first-hand experience of seeing their grandparents and other relatives falling ill and
dying. Also, especially when elderly relatives are too ill to move around, they tend to talk a
great deal to the children about their life journey and pending death. These experiences are
likely to provide this group of children with informal learning opportunities that can help
them grasp some key facts about death earlier than their British counterparts.
Another factor that might influence children’s conceptualizations of death is religion.
From an early age, British Muslim children go to mosques, participate in religious
activities, and are taught about the purpose of life and its relation to death. Religion also
plays a big part in the lives of Pakistani Muslim children, who are taught how to read the
Quran at school and have religious education as part of their curriculum. Muslims have
special death prayers that they recite when a person dies, and believe that, after death,
people eventually return to Allah. Children are also taught to do good deeds in order to be
rewarded after death. Exposure to these religious beliefs might lead Muslim children to
believe that people’s mental functions such as thinking or feeling continue beyond death
(Bering et al., 2005) and therefore delay a biological conception of death. This delaymight
be more evident amongst religious Muslim children than amongst White British from
secular schools, for whom religion is likely to be less influential.
We made a number of predictions about (1) the sequence of death subcomponent
acquisition and (2) the differences between the three cultural groups inunderstanding the
five death subcomponents. In line with previous research (Slaughter & Griffiths, 2007;
Slaughter, Jaakkola, & Carey, 1999), our first predictionwas that the three cultural groups
would show a similar pattern of subcomponent acquisition. Irreversibility was expected
to be understood first, as early as 4–5 years, and causality last, after the age of 6–7 years.
Thus, children’s understanding of neither irreversibility nor causality was expected to
change between these two ages. Inevitability, cessation, and applicability were expected
to appear either at the same time as, or after irreversibility, but before causality. For these
three subcomponents, we expected an improvement between 4–5 and 6–7 years.
Our second prediction was that rural Pakistani Muslim children – who witness the
death of animals and humans more often and openly than their British counterparts –
would understand irreversibility earlier. Our third and fourth predictions were that
Muslim children (British and Pakistani) would offer fewer biological explanations for
applicability and cessation thanWhite British children, owing to their greater exposure to
religious beliefs about the afterlife. Beliefs such as Allah never dies, and people are
rewarded or punished after death, contradict the biological fact that death applies to
everyone (applicability) and thatwhenpeople die, all physical andmental functions come
to an end (cessation).
Finally, we expected some of these differences to be reflected not only in children’s
scores but also in their types of explanations. For example, we predicted that British and
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Pakistani Muslim children would make more religious references when talking about
applicability and cessation than White British children.
Method
Participants
Participants were 188 children: 82 4- to 5-year-olds and 106 6- to 7-year-olds. The
younger group consisted of 33 White British (16 boys, 17 girls; M = 5.1 years,
SD = 3.6 months), 24 British Muslim (12 boys and 12 girls; M = 5.3 years SD =
5.2 months), and 25 Pakistani Muslim (16 boys and 9 girls; M = 5.4 years,
SD = 4.2 months) children. The older group consisted of 44 White British (20 boys
and 24 girls; M = 7.2 years, SD = 3.9 months), 26 British Muslim (14 boys and 12 girls;
M = 7.1 years, SD = 6.4 months), and 36 Pakistani Muslim (15 boys and 21 girls;
M = 6.9 years, SD = 5.2 months) children.
White British children were recruited from two secular state primary schools in
London. British Muslim children, who also attended London state primary schools, were
recruited from three London mosques during days when they attended special religious
classes. All British children came from middle and lower socio-economic backgrounds.
The younger group was interviewed either at the end of Reception year or at the
beginning of Year 1. Similarly, 6- to 7-year-oldswere interviewed either at the endof Year 2
or at the beginning of Year 3.
Pakistani Muslim children were recruited from two state primary schools in two
villages outside the town of Gadap, Karachi, and came from low socio-economic
backgrounds. The younger group was attending kindergarten (reception), and the older
group was in class (Year) 2 of junior school.
Measures
The death concept interviewwas based on previous studies (Lazar & Torney-Purta, 1991;
Slaughter&Griffiths, 2007) and assessed children’s understanding of five subcomponents
of death. Children were asked the following questions:
1. Inevitability – Can you tell me some things that die? Do all (things mentioned) die? If
people not mentioned: Do people die? If yes: Do all people die?
2. Applicability – Can you tell me a few things that never ever die?
3. Irreversibility – Could a dead person at some time become a living person?
4. Cessation –When a person is dead, do they need food? Do they need air? Do they have
dreams?
5. Causality – Can you tell me something that might happen that would make someone
die?
Procedure
Participants were individually interviewed in a quiet room in their school/mosque.
They were told that they did not have to answer any questions they did not want to and
that they could go back to their classroom at any time. Interviews lasted approximately
15–20 min. British children were interviewed in English. For the Pakistani Muslim
children, interviews were conducted in Urdu and responses were translated into
English. All three interviewers were British-born Urdu speakers studying at a London
university.
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Coding
Death knowledge
For each subcomponent, children received a score of 0, 1, or 2 (Appendix 1). An overall
score, with a possible maximum of 10, was calculated for each child. A second
independent judge scored one-third of the data. The resulting agreement was 98% for
inevitability, 97% for applicability, 100% for irreversibility and cessation, and 94% for
causality.
Responses to each question were also grouped into a small number of categories
that allowed us to explore the different types of children’s explanations (Table 1). For
each question, there was a ‘biological response’ category and a small number of
non-biological response categories reflecting children’s alternative ideas. For example,
the question ‘Tell me a few things that never die’ elicited four response types: (1) Only
non-living things die; (2) Some living and some non-living things die; (3) God/Allah never
dies; and (4) I don’t know. The question ‘Could a dead person at some time become a
living person?’ elicited three response types: (1) No; (2) Yes; and (3) Yes, qualified by a
religious reference such as ‘on the day of judgment’. An independent judge scored
one-third of the data. Agreement was 100% on all subcomponents except for causality,
for which agreement was 95%.
Table 1. Responses to the five questions by cultural group (% in parentheses)
Death subcomponent
Cultural group
White British
(n = 77)
British Muslim
(n = 50)
Pakistani Muslim
(n = 61)
Inevitability (do all people die?)
All people/animals/plants die 51 (66) 37 (74) 32 (52)
Some people/animals/plants die (not all) 25 (33) 13 (26) 25 (41)
Only animals/plants die 1 (1) – 4 (7)
Applicability (things that never die)
Non-living things only 46 (60) 23 (46) 30 (49)
Some living and some non-living things 20 (15) 4 (8) 9 (15)
God/Allah never dies 15 (12) 18 (36) 1 (2)
Don’t know 5 (4) 5 (10) 21 (34)
Irreversibility
No 62 (80) 37 (74) 59 (96)
Yes 6 (8) 8 (16) 1 (2)
Yes with religious references 9 (12) 5 (10) 1 (2)
Cessation (do dead people need
food/air and have dreams?)
No to 2/3 questions 57 (74) 44 (88) 52 (86)
Yes to 2/3 questions 20 (26) 6 (12) 8 (14)
Causality (something that can make one die)
Some reference to biological causes 14 (18) 2 (4) 3 (5)
Illness (cancer, TB, heart attacks)/old
age/hunger/accidents
24 (31) 16 (32) 48 (79)
Violent external events (shootings, wars,
guns, knives, stabbings)
36 (47) 24 (48) 2 (3)
When God/Allah wants you to die 2 (3) 4 (8) 4 (7)
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Results
Table 2 shows the mean scores for the five death subcomponents by cultural and age
group. A mixed 3 (cultural group) 9 2 (age) 9 5 (death subcomponent) MANOVA with
repeated measures on the death subcomponents revealed a significant main effect of
subcomponent, F(4, 179) = 171.28, p < .001, partial g2 = .91. Pairwise comparisons
indicated that children’s scores on irreversibility, inevitability, and cessation were higher
than on applicability (ps < .001) and that their scores on all four of these subcomponents
were higher than on causality (ps < .001).
There was also a main effect of age: Across the five subcomponents, older children
scored higher than younger children, F(4, 182) = 19.01, p < .001, partial g2 = .10.
The MANOVA showed an interaction between age and death subcomponent, F(4,
179) = 3.17, p < .02, partial g2 = .07. ANOVAs indicated that 6- to 7-year-olds performed
significantly better than 4- to 5-year-olds on inevitability, F(1, 186) = 16.03, p < .001, partial
g2 = .07, applicability, F(1, 186) = 4.57, p = .04, partial g2 = .02, and cessation, F(21,
186) = 6.12,p = .01, partialg2 = .03. Therewereno significant agedifferences in children’s
irreversibility and causality scores: Irreversibility scores were similarly high amongst 4- to 5-
and 6- to 7-year-olds, whereas causality scores were similarly low in both age groups.
There were no significant differences between the three cultural groups in general
understanding of death (i.e., across the five subcomponents), F(2, 182) = 0.58, p = .56, partial
g2 < .01, although there was a marginally significant interaction between cultural group and
age, F(2, 182) = 2.34, p = .09, partial g2 = .25: The Pakistani children’s scores were
(non-significantly) lowerat4–5 yearsandhigherat6–7 years than theother twogroups’ scores.
However, there was a significant interaction between cultural group and subcompo-
nent, F(8, 360) = 4.58, p < .001, partialg2 = .09. Post hocTukeyHSD tests indicated that
Pakistani Muslim children had the highest irreversibility scores, outperforming both
White and British Muslim groups (ps < .05), and British Muslim children had higher
inevitability scores thanPakistaniMuslimchildren (p < .05).With respect to applicability,
White British children had higher scores than Pakistani and British Muslim children, but
only the difference between White British and Pakistani Muslim children reached
significance. In addition,White British childrenhad higher causality scores than both their
British Muslim and Pakistani Muslim counterparts (all ps < .05).
Thesemain effects and interactionswere qualified by a 3-way interaction between age,
cultural group, and subcomponent, F(8, 360), p < .05, partial g2 = .04. Figure 1 shows
the death subcomponent means by age group for the three cultural groups. ANOVAs
showed that while Pakistani Muslims’ scores on inevitability, cessation (ps < .01), and
applicability (p = .05) were higher in the 6- to 7-year-old group, a significant age
differencewas only revealed for applicability amongst theWhite British children (p = .02)
British Muslim Pakistani MuslimWhite British
0
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Figure 1. Death concept subcomponent mean scores by age group for the three cultural groups
(maximum = 2).
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and for inevitability amongst the British Muslims (p = .02). In fact, the British Muslims’
applicability scores showed a non-significant decrease between these ages.
Influence of cultural group on children’s types of responses
This analysis provided further insight into the types of explanations given by children
about death. The focus was on differences between the three cultural groups, so the age
groups were collapsed. A series of chi-square tests revealed significant associations
between cultural group and response type for the subcomponents of irreversibility,
v2(4) = 11.71, p = .02; applicability, v2(6) = 43.45, p < .001; and causality,
v2(6) = 57.57, p < .001. Table 1 shows the distribution of response types to the five
death questions by cultural group.
With respect to the subcomponent of irreversibility, the majority of White British and
British Muslim children knew that death is irreversible. The remainder said that dead
people can come back to life. Around half of the minority of children who said that dead
people can come back to life qualified their ‘yes’ responses with religious explanations.
For example, British Muslim children said ‘you can come back in life after death’ and ‘on
theDay of Judgment’,whileWhite British children said ‘you can comeback to life inGod’s
house’ or ‘if you are special like God’. Pakistani Muslim children’s responses to the
irreversibility question were very different. Only two children said that dead people can
come back to life. Of these, only one gave a religious explanation (‘you can come back to
life if you go to Janna’). The two British groups contrasted sharply with the Pakistani
Muslim group, who showed very little evidence for the influence of religion in their ideas
about irreversibility.
In response to questions about applicability, aroundone-third of BritishMuslimchildren
referred to religion (e.g., ‘Allah never dies’ or ‘prophets and Imams never die’). Similar
responses, such as ‘God or Jesus never die’, were given by a smaller percentage (12%) of
White British children. Only one Pakistani Muslim child said that Allah never dies, while
one-third could not name things that never die. Contrary to our expectations, Pakistani
Muslim children’s ideas about applicability showed no evidence of religious influences.
With respect to the subcomponent of causality, the majority of Pakistani Muslim
children mentioned illness or old age (e.g., ‘you die because of a heart attack’, ‘because
you are old’), compared with one-third of White British and British Muslims. Amongst the
Pakistani Muslims, only two children referred to violent events (e.g., ‘you die because of
an explosion’, ‘because ofwars’),whereas these causeswere given by nearly half ofWhite
British and British Muslim children. Finally, there were very few biological explanations,
given mainly byWhite British children. Responses such as ‘you die when the heart stops’
and ‘when you cannot breathe’ were classified as biological because children mentioned
the cessation of an organ’s functioning.
Discussion
This study explored the influence of cultural experiences on the development of
children’s understanding of death by comparing responses to a death concept interview
given by White British, British Muslim, and Pakistani Muslim 4- to 5- and 6- to 7-year-olds.
Children answered questions about inevitability, applicability, irreversibility, cessation,
and causality of death. Analyses focused on the sequence of death subcomponent
acquisition, and on age and cultural group differences in children’s understanding.
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Results indicated that the sequence of subcomponent acquisitionwas similar forWhite
British, British Muslim, and Pakistani Muslim children. As predicted, and consistent with
previous research (Slaughter&Griffiths, 2007; Slaughter & Lyons, 2003), for children in all
three groups, irreversibility was one of the first subcomponents to be grasped, whereas
causality was consistently the last. This was also reflected in the finding that in all cultural
groups, irreversibility scoreswereequally highandcausality scores equally lowbetween4-
to 5- and 6- to 7-year-olds. While most 4- to 5-year-olds grasped irreversibility,
understanding ofwhat causes death remained difficult andwas not present before 8 years.
Results also suggested that, for all cultural groups, inevitability, applicability, and
cessation were acquired either at the same time as or after irreversibility and consistently
before causality. In addition, children’s understanding of these three subcomponents
improved significantly with age. This was particularly evident amongst Pakistani Muslim
children, who at 6–7 years had significantly higher inevitability, applicability, and
cessation scores than at 4–5 years. White British and British Muslim 6- to 7-year-olds were
better than their younger counterparts at understanding applicability and inevitability,
respectively. This pattern of death subcomponent acquisition generally replicates
findings from research with Australian (Slaughter & Griffiths, 2007; Slaughter & Lyons,
2003), American (Lazar & Torney-Purta, 1991), and Israeli (Schonfeld & Smilanski, 1989)
children and supports the view that the process of acquisition of the concept of death as a
biological event is, largely, universal.
Despite the similarity in the sequence of subcomponent acquisition amongst our
cultural groups, findings also support the second prediction that Pakistani Muslim children
would understand irreversibility earlier than their British counterparts. It is likely that rural
Pakistani Muslim children are more familiar with the life cycle of domestic animals, and the
killing of these animals for domestic or religious purposes, thanurbanBritish children. Also,
living in impoverished villageswithpoor sanitation and limited access to good health care is
likely to expose Pakistani children to the fact that people die and that death is irreversible,
more often than is the case with their urban British counterparts.
In contrast, there was little support for the third and fourth predictions that Muslim
children (Pakistani and British)would offer fewer biological explanations for applicability
and cessation than White British children due to their more systematic exposure to
religious beliefs about death and the afterlife. No differenceswere found between cultural
groups in terms of understanding of cessation, and only Pakistani Muslim children
understood applicability less well than White British children.
Contrary to our final prediction, it was the two British groups, rather than the two
Muslimgroups, that used religious explanations for the applicability questions.Whilemost
of the Pakistani Muslim children who answered incorrectly did so because they could not
name things that neverdie,most of theBritishMuslimchildrendid sobymaking references
to religion such as ‘Allah never dies’. Responseswith reference toGodwere also givenby a
small number of White British children. It appears that religion may influence the way in
which some British Muslim and White British children understand the subcomponent of
applicability, in that it reinforces the belief that death does not apply to all living entities. A
similar picture emergedwhen children’s explanations of irreversibilitywere examined:Of
the 61PakistaniMuslimchildren, only one said that ‘youcan comeback to life on theday of
judgment’, compared with 10% of British Muslim and 12% of White British children, who
referred to religion to justify their belief that death is irreversible.
There are two possible reasons why Pakistani Muslim children’s responses about
applicability and irreversibility did not reflect religious influences, whereas some British
Muslim and White British children’s responses did. Pakistani Muslim children are
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religious, butmost are also directly exposed to the life cycle of animals and humans. These
experiences are likely to provide them with more powerful learning opportunities than
religious instruction. Moreover, despite our initial assumption that religion would be
more influential for Muslim children than for their White British counterparts, their
responses suggest that a number of White British children also came from religious
backgrounds that informed some of their explanations about death. This might also
explain why, contrary to our prediction, there were no differences in the three groups’
understanding of cessation.
The finding that Pakistani Muslim children’s explanations of what causes death
centred around illness, old age, or hunger, as opposed to shootings, wars, or explosions –
the preferred explanations of British children – further supports the view that children’s
culturally specific experiences influence the way they reason about aspects of death.
British children are likely to be influenced by exposure tomedia, such as books, cartoons,
films, and computer games, where death is often portrayed as a result of violent events,
rather than by direct exposure to ill, dying, or dead people (Mahon, 2011; Wenestram &
Wass, 1987). In contrast, Pakistani Muslim children living in rural and deprived areas in
Pakistan, who have limited access to Western media, are more likely to have a more
realistic view that death usually results from illness or old age.
Another partial explanation for the differences between PakistaniMuslims and the two
groups of British children may be that some of the death interview questions, as asked,
work differently in English than in Urdu, the language in which the Pakistani children
were interviewed. Despite the careful translation of the questions to and fromEnglish, it is
possible that subtle differences inwords between the two languagesmight have led to the
misunderstanding ormisinterpretation of some items. For example, the question ‘Can you
tell me a few things that never ever die?’ might have confused many Pakistani children,
which might explain why one-third of this group could not answer the applicability
question compared with 4% of White British and 10% of British Muslim children.
Finally, no differences were found betweenWhite British and British Muslim children
in their understanding of inevitability, applicability, irreversibility, and cessation. This
suggests that similar schools, socio-economic status, and exposure to the same sources of
information through the media may influence British children’s ideas about death in
similar ways. And although White British children had higher causality scores than their
BritishMuslim counterparts, the percentages of participants in these twogroups that used
violent external events to explain death causality were almost identical, providing further
support for the influence of the media in these children’s conceptualizations of death.
The finding that British Muslim children demonstrated a very similar understanding of
applicability and cessation to White British children suggests that the role of religion is not
powerful enough to differentiate these two groups. Alternatively, more of the White British
children might have come from religious (e.g., Christian and Jewish) backgrounds than we
hadexpected, andtherefore,differencesbetweenthe twoBritishgroups in termsofexposure
to religion were smaller than initially assumed. This interpretation can only be tentative,
as no information about the religious background of White British children was recorded.
Although this limitation does not allow for strong claims regarding the impact of religion
on different cultural groups, it provides some evidence consistent with the view that
biological and religious ideas about deathmight coexist in children’s thinking (i.e., the dead
cannot come back to life unless they are special like God). Althoughwe can only speculate,
it is possible that if the interview questions in this study primed religious interpretations of
death, as thework ofHarris andGimenez (2005) shows, evenmore responseswould reflect
the integration of religious views in children’s biological explanations.
Understanding of death 11
Another limitation of this study concerns the lack of measuring cultural practices and
experiences thatmight explain differences between the cultural groups.We assumed that
rural Pakistani childrenwitness the slaughtering of animals and the death of relativesmore
openly than their urban British counterparts, due to the different cultural practices they
are exposed to and environments they live in. We therefore predicted that rural Pakistani
children would develop an earlier understanding of irreversibility. Nevertheless, we
cannot dismiss the possibility that many British childrenmight also experience the deaths
of relatives or friends or be exposed to open conversations about death. Future research
should document what children from different cultural environments hear in conversa-
tions about the life cycle and death, to help establish how specific cultural beliefs
influence children’s explanations (Astuti & Harris, 2008; Waxman, Medin, & Ross, 2007).
This study has provided evidence for the view that the process of understanding death
as a biological event is, largely, universal as was reflected in the finding that the sequence
of acquisition of irreversibility, inevitability, cessation, applicability, and causality was
similar amongst our three groups of children.However, the influenceof culturally specific
experiences, such as living in impoverished conditions or observing animals being
slaughtered, is likely to explain why rural Pakistani Muslim children grasp the idea that
death is irreversible earlier than their British counterparts, why they rarely make religious
references, and why their explanations of what causes death differ from those of their
urban British counterparts. Similar cultural experiences, and possibly socio-economic
status, education, and degree of exposure toWesternmedia – all shared by the two groups
of British children –might explain why very few differences were found between them.
Finally, there was little evidence of religion making more of an impact on children’s
understanding of death subcomponents than culturally specific experiences, particularly
those arising from living in rural versus urban settings.
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Appendix 1: Scoring criteria for responses to the death questions
Inevitability (Can you tell me some things that die? Do all . . . die?
If people not mentioned . . . Do people die? Do all people die?)
0 – People not mentioned as dying and when asked ‘do people die?’ they answer ‘no’
1 – People not mentioned as dying but when asked ‘do people die?’ they answer ‘yes’
1 – People mentioned as dying but when asked ‘do all people die?’ they answer ‘no’
2 – People mentioned as dying and all people die
Applicability (Can you tell me a few things that never ever die?)
0 –Only living things mentioned
1 – Mixture of living and non-living things mentioned
2 –Only non-living things mentioned (God, Allah, prophets, Imams and angels were accepted only if
they were additional to a list of non-living things)
Irreversibility (Could a dead person at some time become a live person?)
0 – Yes
0 –On the day of judgment/If they go to Jannah/By reciting Al Fatihah/In God’s house/If you go up in
heaven
2 – No
Cessation (When a person is dead, do they need food? Do they need air? Do they have dreams?)
0 – Two or three ‘yes’ responses
1 – Two ‘no’ responses
2 – Three ‘No’ responses
Causality (Can you tell me something that might happen that would make someone die?)
0 – External cause of illness without any biological explanation (e.g., cancer/guns/swords/old age/
accidents/knives/hunger/fire)
0 – Reference to religion (e.g., if Allah wants us to die/God’s will)
1 – Reference to body or organ but not to fully explicit biological cause (e.g., heart stops beating/if you
are not able to breathe/someone cuts your throat)
2 – Explicit biological causal answer (knives because they cut your body and all your blood comes out so
you die)
14 Georgia Panagiotaki et al.
